Coedición:
Euskal Herriko Unibertsitateko Argitalpen Zerbitzua / Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco
Centro de Análisis, Lógica e Informática Jurídica (CALIJ)

Volume 30/1, January 2015, pp. 1-156            ISSN 0495-4548 / ISSNe: 2171-679X

Editor: Andoni Ibarra                                   Más información / Texto completo

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S . U . M . M . A . R . Y

Monographic section:   Unification and coherence
Guest Editors:  Ioannis Votsis and Gerhard Schurz

Guest Editors’ Introduction
Ioannis Votsis, Gerhard Schurz  .....  7-9

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UPV/EHU. Theoria, 2015, Vol. 30/1, p. 11-41                    (www.a360grados.net)
DOI: 10.1387/theoria.12485

Inconsistency as a Touchstone for Coherence Measures
Mark Siebel, Michael Schippers

Abstract:  The debate on probabilistic measures of coherence has focused on evaluating sets of consistent propositions. In this paper we draw attention to the largely neglected question of whether such measures concur with intuitions on test cases involving inconsistent propositions and whether they satisfy general adequacy constraints on coherence and inconsistency. While it turns out that, for the vast majority of measures in their original shape, this question must be answered in the negative, we show that it is possible to adapt many of them in order to improve their performance.

Keywords:  coherence, inconsistency, confirmation, probabilistic measures, Bayesian epistemology

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UPV/EHU. Theoria, 2015, Vol. 30/1, p. 43-52                    (www.a360grados.net)
DOI: 10.1387/theoria.11725

The Possibility of Coherentism and the Stringency of Ceteris Paribus Conditions
Jonah N. Schupbach

Abstract:  Schupbach (2008) puts forward a "possibility result" for Bayesian Coherentism, showing that there exist plausible sets of ceteris paribus conditions that imply that coherence is truth-conducive. Against this result, Schubert (2012) has argued that Schupbach's considered ceteris paribus conditions are "jointly inconsistent". In this article, I first show that Schubert's attempted proof of this claim is fallacious, and hence that the possibility result still stands. Next, I consider a related criticism of Schupbach's result, inspired by Olsson's (2005) constraints on ceteris paribus conditions. This leads to a general discussion of the principle(s) that should guide one in choosing such conditions.

Keywords:  Bayesianism; Ceteris Paribus Conditions; Coherence; Confirmation; Impossibility Results; Probability

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UPV/EHU. Theoria, 2015, Vol. 30/1, p. 53-71                    (www.a360grados.net)
DOI: 10.1387/theoria.11733

Is a coherence theory of understanding possible?
Victor Gijsbers

Abstract:  Coherence is a measure of how much our beliefs hang together. Understanding is achieved when we see that something is not just a brute, isolated fact. This suggests that it might be possible to develop a coherence theory of understanding, which is what we attempt to do in this article using several formal measures of coherence. However, it turns out that a coherence theory runs into trouble with the asymmetry of understanding. We identify four difficulties and give suggestions for how they could be solved. These solutions all point away from coherence and towards a rather different notion, unification, which casts some (though not conclusive) doubt on the possibility of a coherence theory of understanding.

Keywords:  coherence, understanding, explanation, unification, asymmetry

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UPV/EHU. Theoria, 2015, Vol. 30/1, p. 73-95                    (www.a360grados.net)
DOI: 10.1387/theoria.11913

Causality and Unification: How Causality Unifies Statistical Regularities
Gerhard Schurz

Abstract:  Two key ideas of scientific explanation - explanations as causal information and explanation as unification - have frequently been set into mutual opposition.  This paper proposes a "dialectical solution" to this conflict, by arguing that causal explanations are preferable to non-causal explanations because they lead to a higher degree of unification at the level of the explanation of statistical regularities. The core axioms of the theory of causal nets (TC) are justified because they give the best if not the only unifying explanation of two statistical phenomena: screening off and linking up. Alternative explanation attempts are discussed and it is shown why they don't work. It is demonstrated that not the core of TC but extended versions of TC have empirical content, by means of which they can generate independently testable predictions.

Keywords:  Unification, explanation, causality, theory of causal nets, screening off, linking up

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UPV/EHU. Theoria, 2015, Vol. 30/1, p. 97-114                    (www.a360grados.net)
DOI: 10.1387/theoria.12695

Unification: Not Just a Thing of Beauty
Ioannis Votsis

Abstract:  We often hear that simplicity, explanatory power and unification, though aesthetically pleasing or beautiful qualities, are at best pragmatic considerations in matters of choosing between rival hypotheses. This paper aims to offer a novel conception and an associated measure of unification, both of which are demonstrably more than just pragmatic considerations. The discussion departs from a brief survey of some failed attempts to carve out adequate conceptions of unification. It then proceeds to an analysis of the notions of confirmational connectedness and disconnectedness. Roughly speaking, these notions attempt to capture the way support propagates or fails to propagate between the content parts of a hypothesis or, equivalently, between the contents of two or more hypotheses. The two notions are instrumental in helping to tackle the problem of ad hoc, and in particular monstrous, hypotheses. More importantly for the purposes of this paper, they are essential ingredients in the proposed conception of unification and its associated measure. In simple terms, the more the content of a hypothesis (or, equivalently, the content of a set of hypotheses) is confirmationally connected the more that content is unified. Since the confirmational connectedness of two content parts is determined by purely objective matters of fact, the proposed notion and measure of unification are themselves strictly objective, i.e. not merely pragmatic considerations in matters of hypothesis choice. The paper concludes with a discussion of how the proposed measure handles real and hypothetical examples but also how it stands up to various objections.

Keywords:  unification; confirmation; ad hoc; monstrous

Articles             ------------------------------------------------------

UPV/EHU. Theoria, 2015, Vol. 30/1, p. 117-136                    (www.a360grados.net)
DOI: 10.1387/theoria.11909

Pensamientos de se y mente consciente
Javier Vidal

Abstract:  En este artículo, desarrollo una versión modificada de la teoría de la conciencia en términos de pensamientos de orden superior. Argumento que un estado mental es consciente cuando va acompañado por un pensamiento de se implícito. Esta nueva versión es importante porque puede acomodar la objeción de que un pensamiento de orden superior que es la conclusión de una inferencia consciente no puede hacer que un estado mental se vuelva consciente. Argumento también que si la introspección consiste en tener un pensamiento de se explícito, puede mantenerse la distinción entre estados mentales conscientes y estados mentales que, además, están bajo introspección.

Keywords:  conciencia; introspección; pensamientos de se; pensamientos de orden superior

Obituaries               ------------------------------
 

Carlos París (1925-2014). In memoriam
Pedro Ribas .....  39-142

Book Reviews         ----------------------------
 

Atocha Aliseda (2014): La Lógica como herramienta de la razón. Razonamiento ampliativo en la creatividad, la cognición y la inferencia
Alfredo Marcos  .....  145-147