Theoria

Revista de teoría, historia y fundamentos de la ciencia.

An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science

Euskal Herriko Unibertsitateko Argitalpen Zerbitzua/Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco.

Vol. 21/1, Nº 55, 2006

SECCION MONOGRAFICA

Scientific Representation

Guest Editors: José Díez y Roman Frigg

José Díez (Tarragona) y Roman Frigg (Londres): Introduction

BIBLID [0495-4548 (2006) 21: 55; p. 5]

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Andreas Bartels (Bonn): Defending the Structural Concept of Representation

BIBLID [0495-4548 (2006) 21: 55; pp. 7-19]

ABSTRACT: The aim of this paper is to defend the structural concept of representation, as defined by homomorphisms, against its main objections, namely: logical objections, the objection from misrepresentation, the objection from failing necessity, and the copy theory objection. The logical objections can be met by reserving the relation ‘to be homomorphic to’ for the explication of potential representation (or, of the representational content). Actual reference objects (‘targets’) of representations are determined by (intentional or causal) representational mechanisms. Appealing to the independence of the dimensions of ‘content’ and ‘target’ also helps to see how the structural concept can cope with misrepresentation. Finally, I argue that homomorphic representations are not necessarily ‘copies’ of their representanda, and thus can convey scientific insight.

Key words: (structural concept of) representation, homomorphism, content.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Andoni Ibarra, Thomas Mormann (San Sebastián): Scientific Theories as Intervening Representations

BIBLID [0495-4548 (2006) 21: 55; pp. 21-38]

ABSTRACT: In this paper some classical representational ideas of Hertz and Duhem are used to show how the dichotomy between representation and intervention can be overcome. More precisely, scientific theories are reconstructed as complex networks of intervening representations (or representational interventions). The formal apparatus developed is applied to elucidate various theoretical and practical aspects of the in vivo/in vitro problem of biochemistry. Moreover, adjoint situations (Galois connections) are used to explain the relation between empirical facts and theoretical laws in a new way.

Key words: Representation, adjoint situations, in vitro/in vivo problem, Hertz, Duhem.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Mauricio Suárez y Albert Solé (Madrid): On the Analogy between Cognitive Representation and Truth

BIBLID [0495-4548 (2006) 21: 55; pp. 39-48]

ABSTRACT: In this paper we claim that the notion of cognitive representation (and scientific representation in particular) is irreducibly plural. By means of an analogy with the minimalist conception of truth, we show that this pluralism is compatible with a generally deflationary attitude towards representation. We then explore the extent and nature of representational pluralism by discussing the positive and negative analogies between the inferential conception of representation advocated by one of us and the minimalist conception of truth.

Key words: representation, inferential conception, truth, minimalism.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Roman Frigg (Londres): Scientific Representation and the Semantic View of Theories

BIBLID [0495-4548 (2006) 21: 55; pp. 49-65]

ABSTRACT: It is now part and parcel of the official philosophical wisdom that models are essential to the acquisition and organisation of scientific knowledge. It is also generally accepted that most models represent their target systems in one way or another. But what does it mean for a model to represent its target system? I begin by introducing three conundrums that a theory of scientific representation has to come to terms with and then address the question of whether the semantic view of theories, which is the currently most widely accepted account of theories and models, provides us with adequate answers to these questions. After having argued in some detail that it does not, I conclude by pointing out in what direction a tenable account of scientific representation might be sought.

Keywords: Scientific representation, models, semantic view of theories, isomorphism, similarity.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Craig Callender y Jonathan Cohen (San Diego, California): There Is No Special Problem About Scientific Representation

BIBLID [0495-4548 (2006) 21: 55; pp. 67-85]

ABSTRACT: We propose that scientific representation is a special case of a more general notion of representation, and that the relatively well worked-out and plausible theories of the latter are directly applicable to the scientific special case. Construing scientific representation in this way makes the so-called “problem of scientific representation” look much less interesting than it has seemed to many, and suggests that some of the (hotly contested) debates in the literature are concerned with non-issues.

Key words: scientific representation, mental representation, models.

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

ARTICULOS

Pierre Cassou-Noguès (Lille, France): Signs, figures and time: Cavaillès on “intuition” in mathematics

BIBLID [0495-4548 (2006) 21: 55; pp. 89-104]

ABSTRACT: This paper is concerned with Cavaillès’ account of “intuition” in mathematics. Cavaillès starts from Kant’s theory of constructions in intuition and then relies on various remarks by Hilbert to apply it to modern mathematics. In this context, “intuition” includes the drawing of geometrical figures, the use of algebraic or logical signs and the generation of numbers as, for example, described by Brouwer. Cavaillès argues that mathematical practice can indeed be described as “constructions in intuition” but that these constructions are not imbedded in the space and in the time of our Sensibility, as Kant believed: They take place in other structures which are engendered in the history of mathematics. This leads Cavaillès to a critical discussion of both Hilbert’s and Brouwer’s foundational programs.

Key words: sign, symbol, figure, time, intuition, Cavaillès, Hilbert, Brouwer, Kant.